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ABSTRACT 
An outstanding problem in psychiatry concerns how to link discoveries about the 
pharmacological, neurophysiological, and neuroanatomical substrates of mental disorders 
to the abnormal behaviors that they control. A related problem concerns how to 
understand abnormal behaviors on a continuum with normal behaviors. During the past 
few decades, neural models have been developed of how normal cognitive and emotional 
processes learn from the environment, focus attention and act upon motivationally 
important events, and cope with unexpected events. When arousal or volitional signals in 
these models are suitably altered, they give rise to symptoms that strikingly resemble 
negative and positive symptoms of schizophrenia, including flat affect, impoverishment 
of will, altentional problems, loss of a theory of mind, thought derailment, hallucinations, 
and delusions. The present article models how emotional centers of the brain, such as the 
amygdala, interact with sensory and prcf!·ontal cortices (notably ventral, or orbital, 
prefrontal cortex) to generate affective states, attend to motivationally salient sensory 
events, and elicit motivated behaviors. Closing this feedback loop between cognitive and 
emotional centers is predicted to generate a cognitive-emotional resonance that can 
support conscious awareness. When such emotional centers become depressed, negative 
symptoms of schizophrenia emerge in the model. Such emotional centers are modeled as 
opponent affective processes, such as fear and relief, whose response amplitude and 
sensitivity are calibrated by an arousal level and chemical transmitters that slowly 
inactivate, or habituate, in an activity-dependent way. These opponent processes exhibit 
an Inverted-U whereby behavior become depressed if the arousal level is chosen too large 
or too small. The negative symptoms are due to the way in which the depressed 
opponent process interacts with other circuits throughout the brain. 
METHODS AND MATERIALS 
1. Introduction: Attention, Affect, and Volition in Schizophrenia 
It is well known that schizophrenia involves a loss of attentional control, motivational 
defects, and disorganized behavior. Kraepelin (191311919) early noted that This 
behavior is without doubt clearly related to the disorder of attention which we very 
frequently find conspicuously developed in our patients. It is quite common for them to 
loss both inclination and ability on their own initiative to keep their attention fixed for 
any length of time (pp. 5-6). Attentional deficits in schizophrenia have also been 
emphasized by a number of other workers; e.g., Bleuler ( 191 111950), Braff ( 1985) and 
Mirsky (1969). 
Since the time of Kraepelin, many efforts have been made to classify schizophrenic 
symptoms across distinct patient populations, including the basic classifications into 
negative and positive symptoms, or deficit and nondeficit symptoms (Buchanan et a/., 
1997; Bustillo eta/., 1997). Liddle (1994) has segregated schizophrenic symptoms into 
three distinguishable syndromes: (I) psychomotor poverty (poverty of speech, flat 
affect, decreased spontaneous movement); (2) disorganisation (disorders of the form of 
thought, inappropriate affect); and (3) reality distortion (delusions and hallucinations) 
(p. 43), which have been supported by several studies (Arndt eta/., 1991; Pantel is eta/., 
1991; Sauer eta/., 1991 ). Liddle suggested that two of these syndromes reflect volitional 
disorders: psychomotor poverty reflects a difl1culty initiating activity and disorganisation 
reflects a difficulty in the selection of appropriate activity (p, 43). Both of these 
problems arc, moreover, associated with impairment in neuropsychological tests of 
frontal lobe function. 
In a different direction, Frith (1992, I 994) has interpreted schizophrenic symptoms as 
impairments in the processes that underlie a theory of mind , including the ability to 
represent beliefs and intentions. For example, when asked to describe photographs of 
people, schizophrenics described their physical appearance, rather than their mental 
states (Pilowsky and Bassett, I 980). Frith noted, however, that the theory of mind 
approach does not explain the other major feature of negative schizophrenia: their 
impoverishment of will. (Frith, 1994, p. I 50). He also wrote that mental states include 
not only affects and emotions, but also goals and intentions. A person who was unaware 
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of their goals could, on the one hand, be a slave to every environmental influence or, on 
the other hand, be prone to pcrseverative or stereotyped behaviour, because they would 
not have the insight to recognize that certain goals were unobtainable or inappropriate 
(Frith, 1994, p. 151 ). 
These introductory remarks underscore the importance of understanding how brain 
mechanisms of attention, affect, and volition interact during both normal behavior and 
schizophrenia. More generally, they raise the fundamental problem of how to link brain 
to behavior. During the past thirty years, neural models of behavior have been making 
such a linkage with ever greater precision. These models have typically been derived to 
explain behavioral data about normal learning and memory. The present article proposes 
how these normal brain processes can break down to give rise to negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia. How positive symptoms may arise has been described elsewhere 
(Grossberg, 1999a). 
2. Attentional Modulation of Learning 
It is well-known that animals and humans learn to attend to the most reliable non-
redundant stimuli in their environment (e.g., Grossberg, 1982b; Kamin, 1969, Staddon, 
1983 ). Attention is controlled by sensory and cognitive expectations, which arc matched 
against sensory inputs. Attention is also controlled by emotional and motivational 
expectations, which are regulated by learned feedback between cognitive representations 
and reward and punishment centers. The present article briefly reviews neural models of 
normal learning during cognitive-emotional interactions to set the stage for suggesting how 
clinical symptoms may arise when modulatory arousal signals within these models 
become imbalanced. 
For example, Figure I summarizes the hypothesis that some symptoms of 
schizophrenia, Parkinson s disease, attention deficit disorder, and depression are 
influenced by a type of opponent processing circuit whose net arousal level may be too 
large or too small in sensory, cognitive, and/or motor circuits, where the particular circuits 
involved can depend on the disorder. Such opponent processing circuits exhibit a Golden 
Mean of optimal behavior at an intermediate arousal level (Grossberg, 1972b, 1984a, 
1984b ). For larger or smaller levels of arousal, behavior deteriorates in different ways, 
thereby giving rise to an lnverted-U as a function of arousal level. In particular, when 
arousal is too small, such an opponent process causes an elevated behavioral threshold, 
since there is not enough arousal to support a more normal threshold. Paradoxically, it 
also gives rise to behavioral hyperexcitability when this elevated threshold is exceeded. 
When arousal is too small, the opponent process causes a low behavioral threshold. 
Paradoxically, it also gives rise to behavioral hypoexcitabili!y when this reduced threshold 
is exceeded. Due to these properties, an increase in arousal can decrease the sensitivity of 
an underaroused opponent process of this kind, and can bring it into the normal 
behavioral range. The model proposes that, in this way, a pharmacological up like 
amphetamine can reduce the hypersensitivity of attention deficit disorder children 
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(Grossberg, 1972b, 1984a). These properties emerge through interactions across the entire 
opponent processing circuit. They cannot be understood just by looking at the 
pharmacology or neurophysiology of individual cells within the circuit. How such 
opponent processes arise during normal behavior will now be described. 
GOLDEN MEAN 
INVERTED U AS A FUNCTION OF AROUSAL 
Behavior 
UNDERAROUSED 
DEPRESSION 
Elevated 
Threshold 
Hyperexcitable 
Above 
Threshold 
Arousal 
OVERAROUSED 
DEPRESSION 
Low 
Threshold 
Hypoexcitable 
Above 
Threshold 
"UP" brings excitability "DOWN" 
Figure 1. Gated dipole opponent processes exhibit an Inverted-U behavioral 
1·esponse as a function of arousal level, with undcraroused and overarouscd 
depressive syndromes occurring at the two ends of the Invcrted-U. Sec text for 
details. 
3. Cognitive-Emotional Interactions and Classical Conditioning 
We begin by reviewing data and models concerning the simplest type of associative 
learning; namely, classical or Pavlovian conditioning (Pavlov, 1927). As shown below, 
classical conditioning is far more subtle and relevant to complex human cognitive-
emotional behavior than one might first realize. During classical conditioning an 
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unconditioned stimulus (US), such as a shock, can elicit an unconditioned response (UR), 
such as fear. Before conditioning, a conditioned stimulus (CS), such as a bell, does not 
elicit fear. However, pairing the CS with the US on a number of learning trials enables the 
CS to acquire some of the reinforcing properties of the shock. It can then elicit a 
conditioned response (CR), including fear, on its own. When this happens, the CS is 
called a conditioned reinfilrcer, because it has acquired reinforcing properties through 
conditioning. 
cs 
-I 
!+-IS17l!._ __ t us 
Figure 2. The lnterstimulus Interval Effect: The 
conditioned response (CR) is strongest at a 
positive value of the Interstimulus Interval, or 
lSI. It deteriorates at smaller and larger values of 
this optimal interval. 
CR 
0 lSI 
t 
Several properties of classical conditioning that are 
relevant to abnormal behaviors are now summarized. 
The first is the lnterstimulus (lSI) Effect (Figure 2): 
When one varies the lSI between the CS and US and 
plots the strength of the learned CR, one often finds 
an lnverted-U curve, which shows that there exists 
an optimal, non-zero lSI for classical conditioning. 
Why learning becomes poor at very large ISis is obvious. But why learning also becomes 
poor at the zero lSI, where the simultaneous CS and US are perfectly correlated is not 
so obvious. We will come back to this point in a moment. 
Phase I 
cs, 
us __ ___Jnc___ 
Fear r----._ 
__ ___.I 1'---
Phase II 
cs, 
cs, 
Fear ______J-j__ 
Figure 3. Secondary conditioning: Aftet· conditioning CS 1 to become a conditioned 
rcinfm·cer by pairing it with a US, CS 1 can be used to condition a new CS, to 
become a conditioned reinforcer. 
A second important property of classical conditioning is Secondary Conditioning (Figure 
3), which is the process whereby conditioned reinforcers can be used as rewards in their 
own right. Secondary conditioning involves at least two learning phases. In the first 
phase, a first CS (CS 1) is associated with a US, say shock, until it becomes a conditioned 
reinforcer that is capable of eliciting fear. In the second learning phase, a new conditioned 
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stimulus (call it CS2) is paired with the conditioned reinforcer CS 1 until CS2 also becomes 
a conditioned reinforcer. 
BlOCKING= lSI +SECONDARY CONDITIONING 
Blocking 
Phase 1 
__fL_ 
_.......,!IL 
----~I'L_ 
Phase 2 
__fL_ 
__fL_ 
~ 
csl 
us 
Fear 
No cs? 
conditioning 
Zero lSI 
__f[_ 
cs __fl_ 
us Fear-J~ 
Noes 
conditioning 
Figure 4: Blocking 
may be explained 
by a combin-ation 
of the mechanisms 
that explain 
sccondm·y 
conditioning and 
why no 
conditioning 
occurs with a zero 
lSI. Sec text for 
details. 
When the lSI Effect 
and Secondary 
Conditioning are 
combined, 
possible 
it IS 
to 
understand how 
classical 
conditioning 1s 
related to processes 
of selective 
attention. This 
linkage is illustrated 
by the process of 
A ttentional 
Blocking (Kamin, 1968, 1969; Pavlov, 1927) whereby sensory events that do not predict 
new rewarding events are not attended. The Blocking paradigm is illustrated in Figure 4. It 
also involves two phases. Phase I involves the usual classical conditioning whereby a CS 
(call it CS 1) becomes a conditioned reinforcer by being paired with a US. Phase II presents 
CS 1 simultaneously with a second conditioned reinforcer (call is CS2) that has not yet been 
associated with a reinforcer. This simultaneous presentation of cues is followed by the 
same US as in Phase I. The result is that CS2 does not become a conditioned reinforcer. 
For example, in the case where the US is a shock, the learning subject does not respond to 
CS2 with fear. Much evidence suggests that this is true because CS2 is predictively 
irrelevant; it does not predict anything more than the previously conditioned CS 1 already 
predicted. This interpretation is supported by the Unblocking paradigm, in which the US 
in Phase II does not equal the US in Phase I. For example, the shock in Phase II may be 
chosen much more intense than the shock in Phase I. Under these conditions, CS2 does 
become a conditioned reinforcer of fear, because it predicts an increase in shock level. 
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Figure 4 shows how Attentional Blocking may be understood as the combined effect of 
the lSI Effect and Secondary Conditioning acting together. The left hand column of Figure 
4 summarizes the Blocking paradigm, wherein CS2 is not conditioned. The right hand 
column depicts the zero lSI condition wherein CS is not conditioned. Note that both 
Blocking and the zero lSI condition involve a simultaneous presentation of an 
unconditioned CS (CS2 in the left column, and CS in the right column) and a reinforcer 
(the conditioned reinforcer csl in the left column, and the primary reinforcer us in the 
right column). The only difference between these cases is due to the Secondary 
Conditioning that converts CS 1 into a conditioned reinforcer in the Blocking paradigm. 
Thus, if we can understand how Secondary Conditioning and the zero lSI effect occur, 
then we can also understand key properties of Attentional Blocking, and from that, as 
suggested below, how attcntional regulation of learning may break down during 
schizophrenia. 
RESULTS 
4. A Neural Model of Cognitive-Emotional Learning 
The IS! Effect, Secondary Conditioning, and Attentional Blocking can all be explained, 
among many other data, using the model summarized in Figure 5. Such a model is called a 
CogEM model because it explains, perhaps in the simplest possible way, data about 
interacting Cognitive, Emotional, and Motor learning properties. It was first introduced in 
Grossberg ( 1971) and has since undergone substantial development (Grossberg, 1972a, 
1972b, 1975, 1982a, 1982b, 1984b; Grossberg and Gutowski, 1987; Grossberg and 
Levine, 1987; Grossberg and Merrill, 1992, 1996; Grossberg and Schmajuk, 1987). 
Variants of this model have also been proposed to explain data about learning in 
invertebrates like Aplvsia (e.g., Buonomano, Baxter, and Byrne, 1990) and on data about 
vertebrate thalamocortical substrates of emotional conditioning (e.g., Agglcton, 1993; 
Davis, 1994; LeDoux, 1993). 
Figure 5 summarizes the hypothesis that (at least) three types of internal 
representation interact during reinforcement learning: sensory and cognitive 
representations S, drive representations D, and motor representations M. The S 
representations arc thalamocortical representations of external events, including the object 
recognition categories that are learned by infcrotcmporal and prefrontal cortical 
interactions (Desimone, 1991; Gochin, Miller, Gross, and Gerstein, 1991; Harries and 
Perrett, 1991; Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982). The D representations include 
hypothalamic and amygdala circuits at which homeostatic and reinforcing cues converge 
to generate emotional reactions and motivational decisions (Aggleton, 1993; Bower, 1981; 
Davis, 1994; Gloor et a!., 1982; Halgren et a/., 1978; LeDoux, 1993). The M 
representations include cortical and cerebellar circuits that control discrete adaptive 
responses (Evarts, 1973; Ito, 1984; Kalaska et a!., 1989; Thompson, 1988). More 
complete models of the internal structure of these several types of representations have 
been developed elsewhere (e.g., Bullock, Cisek, and Grossberg, 1998; Carpenter and 
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Grossberg, 1994; Contreras-Vidal, Grossberg, and Bullock, 1997; Fiala, Grossberg, and 
Bullock, 1996; Grossberg, 1987b; Grossberg and Merrill, 1996; Grossberg and Schmajuk, 
1987). 
SENSORY 
Scs. Competition 
Cond!tic)nOd 
f<c,inforc:c~r 
D 
+ 
r 
ln'!ornc;i 
inpul 
for STM 
DRIVE 1\ilol'or 
MOTOR 
Figure 5: The simplest CogEM model: Three types of interacting representations 
(sensm·y, drive, and motor) that control three types of learning (conditioned 
reinforcer, incentive motivational, and motor) may be used to explain many 
conditioning data. 
Three types of learning take place among these representations: Conditioned reinj(Jrcer 
learning strengthens the adaptive weights, or long-term memory traces, in a S -7 D 
pathway when a CS activates its sensory representation S just before the drive 
representation D is activated by an unconditioned stimulus (US), or other previously 
conditioned reinforcer CSs. The ability of the CS to subsequently activate D via this 
learned pathway is one of its key properties as a conditioned reinforcer. As these S -7 D 
associations are being formed, D -·7 S incentive motivational/earning also occurs, due to 
the same pairing of CS and US. Incentive motivational learning enables an activated drive 
representation D to prime, or modulate, the sensory representations S of all cues, 
including the CSs, that have consistently been correlated with it. Activating D hereby 
generates a motivational set by priming all of the sensory and cognitive representations 
that have been associated with that drive s emotion in the past. These incentive 
motivational signals are a type of motivationally-biased attention. The S -7 M motor, or 
habit, learning enables the sensorimotor maps, vectors, and gains that arc involved in 
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sensory-motor control to be adaptively calibrated, thereby enabling a CS to read-out 
correctly calibrated movements. 
Sensory 
Input 
cs 
STM 
activity 
without 
motivational 
feedback 
STM 
activity 
with 
motivational 
feedback 
(a) 
{b) 
5. Attcntional Blocking 
TIME 
Figure 6. A CS that 
conditioned reinforcer 
is not a 
(row 2) 
activates its sensory representation 
less than after it becomes a 
conditioned reinforcer (row 3) and 
can usc positive feedback from a drive 
representation to dmw attention to 
itself. 
The CogEM model explains altentional blocking as a result of three properties 
interacting together: 
I. Conditioned reinforcer CSs can amplify the activation of their sensory representations 
S via positive feedback from the drive representations D to which they are conditioned. 
2. The sensory representations S compete among themselves for a limited capacity short 
term memory (STM) activation. 
3. Other, non-CS, cues lose activation via competition within the limiled capacity STM, 
and can thereby learn slowly if at all. 
Property (I) is realized as follows: The combination of learned S -~ D conditioned 
reinforcer learning and D -7 S incentive motivational learning form a positive feedback 
loop S -7 D -7 S that is activated when S is turned on by its conditioned reinforcer CS. 
This positive feedback quickly draws attention to CS by amplifying the activation of its 
sensory representations (sec Figure 6). Said in another way, the conditioned reinforcer 
uses motivational feedback to drawn attention to itself. 
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BLOCKING 
II 
STM suppressed 
by competition 
t 
STM amplified 
by(+) feedback 
t 
Figure 7: Amplification of 
a conditioned reinforcet·'s 
activa-tion via positive 
feedback from a drive 
representation enables it 
to block competing CSs 
using lateral inhibition, 
and thereby prevent them 
from being attended or 
generating large output 
signals. 
Property (2) follows from 
the fact that the sensory 
representations use 
recurrent, or feedback, 
interactions among 
themselves to store their 
activities 111 short-term 
memory (Baddeley, 1986). 
This is accomplished by 
linking the sensory 
representations by a 
recurrent on-center off~ 
surround network, whereby 
cells excite themselves and 
possibly their immediate neighbors, and inhibit a wider range of cells, possibly including 
themselves (Figure 5). Such a network enables the sensory representations to store 
activities that retain their sensitivity to the relative sizes of their inputs, while also 
tending to conserve, or normalize, the total activity among the active representations 
(Bradski, Carpenter, and Grossberg, 1994; Grossberg, 1973, 1978a, 1978b; Grossberg and 
Stone, 1986). This activity normalization property realizes the limited capacity of short-
term memory, since when one sensory representation gets very active, the 
representations with which it competes arc forced to become much less active. As a 
result, there is a finite upper bound on how many sensory representations can retain 
suprathreshold levels of activity at the same time. 
The combination of properties (1) and (2) imply property (3), as described in Figure 7. 
When unattended sensory representations S lose activation due to competition from 
attended representations, their output signals are correspondingly reduced or eliminated. 
As a result, any learning that is contingent upon their activation proceeds slowly if at all. 
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cs 
INPUT 
us 
INPUT 
Sus 
ACTIVITY 
(a) 
(b) 
POSITIVE lSI 
TIME 
SAMPLING INTERAL 
Figm·c 8. When a CS occurs 
before a US, it can activate its 
sensory representation before 
the US starts to compete with 
it. Then there is an interval 
during which the sensory 
representation of the CS is 
active, and can be associated 
with other events, before it is 
inhibited. 
Given that a CS can be blocked 
by simultaneous occurrence of a 
primary or conditioned 
reinforcer, how does conditioning 
occur when the CS precedes the 
US? Otherwise expressed, how 
can we explain the lSI Effect? 
Figure 8 schematized a proposed 
answer. l f the CS occurs before 
the US, then its sensory 
representation S can get highly 
activated before the US occurs. 
When the US later occurs, it 
takes awhile for it to inhibit the active CS sensory representation. The interval after the 
US turns on and before the CS sensory representation is inhibited is a sampling or 
learning interval. During this learning interval, the CS sensory representation can send 
signals to D which lead to strengthening of the adaptive weights from S to D, thereby 
converting CS into a conditioned reinforcer. The signals from D to S, in turn, enable the 
adaptive weights in their paths to learn also, thereby enabling D to motivationally prime 
these sensory representations. Finally, the active S representation can also learn sensory-
motor associations with M. 
In order to generate motivationally appropriate behaviors, the circuit in Figure 7 needs to 
be refined. One such refinement deals with the following problem. In its present form, 
after a reinforcing cue activates a sensory representation S, then S can activate a motor 
representation M at the same time that it sends conditioned reinforcer signals to a drive 
representation D. Thus a motor response can be initiated before the sensory 
representation receives incentive motivational feedback to determine whether the sensory 
cue should generate a response at tbat time. For example, eating behavior could be 
initiated before the network could determine if it was hungry. 
]] 
cs ---+ SENSORY STM 
1..-t 
~ ? 
~ 
I 
DRIVE 
REPRESENTATION 
DRIVE 
-
Figure 9. Au expanded 
version of the CogEM 
model, including at least 
two stages of sensory 
t·epresentation, is needed 
to gate commands to 
motor centers unless they 
are motivationally appro-
priate. The question mark 
raises the question of 
what the anatomical Joens 
of the second stage may 
be. 
6. Polyvalent Cortical Cells and Motivational Gating of Attention and Responding 
This problem is corrected by using a key property of drive representations D to refine 
the structure of sensory representations S. In the circuit of Figure 5, each drive 
representation D obeys a po(vvalent constraint whereby it can generate incentive 
motivational output signals to sensory representations only if it gets a sufficiently large 
primary or conditioned reinforcer input at the same time that it gets a sufficiently large 
internal drive input. The internal drive input designates whether an internal drive, such as 
hunger, thirst, sex, etc., is high and in need of satisfaction. Different drive representations 
exist to represent these distinct internal homeostatic states. Due to the polyvalent 
constraint at the drive representation, an external reinforcing cue cannot activate strong 
incentive motivation, and with it action, to satisfy a drive that is already satisfied, because 
the drive input would be too small to satisfy the drive representation s polyvalent 
constraint. In contrast, the sensory representations in the circuit of Figure 5 can trigger an 
action even without incentive motivational support, because these sensory 
representations do not obey a polyvalent constraint. Imposing such a polyvalent 
constraint on the sensory representations would prevent them from triggering an action 
until they get incentive feedback from a motivationally-consistent drive representation. 
This is done by giving each sensory representation S two successive processing stages, 
such that the second stage obeys a polyvalent constraint, as in Figure 9. 
To see how this polyvalent constraint at S solves the problem, suppose that the first 
stage of S sends a large reinforcing signal to a drive representation at a time when the drive 
representation happens also to be receiving a sufficiently large drive input. Then the 
polyvalent constraint of the drive representation is satisfied and the drive representation 
can fire. In other words, the drive representation can fire when the drive is not yet 
satisfied and sensory cues arc available that predict drive satisfaction. All the drive 
representations that are active at that time compete among themselves to allow the most 
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active one---the one that represents the best combination of sensory and drive 
information at that moment---to fire. Suppose that the winning drive representation 
delivers a strong incentive motivational signal to the second stage of an active sensory 
representation S. Then the polyvalent constraint of the second stage is satisfied, and it 
can generate output signals. In summary, by making the final stages of both the sensory 
and the drive representations polyvalent, the S ---; M motor pathways are activated only 
if the S ---; D ---; S feedback pathway can get sufficiently activated. Then the network 
generates a strong conditioned response only if it receives enough motivational support. It 
is worth noting that the second sensory stage is also involved in regulating the release of 
motor responses. 
The circuit in Figure 9 also shows how positive feedback from the second stage to the 
first stage of active sensory representations S amplifies only those active first-stage 
sensory representations whose features are motivationally prepotent in the present 
context. This amplification of activity enables these sensory representations to 
altcntionally block less salient representations via S ---; S lateral inhibition, as in Figure 7. 
When this happens, a cognitive-emotional resonance can be established that can support 
conscious awareness. This resonance is altcntionally focused through motivational 
feedback on emotionally salient information (Grossberg, I 980, I 982b, I 984b; Grossberg 
and Merrill, I 996) 
7. Resonant Interactions between Sensory Cortices, Amygdala, and Ol'l>ital 
Pt·efrontal Cortex 
The circuit in Figure 9 may, in principle, be replicated at multiple stages of 
thalamocortical and corticocortical processing of sensory events. For example, stage one 
may be a thalamic stage, and stage two a cortical stage, as in the data of LeDoux (I 993). 
For present purposes, we interpret Figure 9 in terms of the circuit depicted in Figure I 0, 
which shows that many different types of sensory cortex, including visual, 
somatosensory, auditory, gustatory, and olfactory cortex, arc connected to both the 
amygdala (and other emotional centers) and to the prefrontal cortex, and that the 
amygdala also sends a strong projection to the prefrontal cortex (Barbas, 1995). This 
interpretation is given by the model circuit in Figure I I. Here, the various sensory 
cortices play the role of the first stages of the sensory representations; the ventral, or 
orbital, prefrontal cortex plays the role of the second stages of the sensory 
representations; and the amygdala and related structures play the role of the drive 
representations. 
I3 
.----1 Somatosensory 
Cortex 
Gustatory 
Cortex 
rOifactory 
Cortex 
;A·· ... ____ ,..,~ 
I • 
! ', 
,M 
: y ~ 
: G : 
I 
\. ~ ,J~ 
· .. A;-------~ ... 
• 
·. / 
Figure I 0. The amygdala receives inputs from many sensory cortices and 
generates outputs to the prefrontal cortex. The sensot·y cortices also project to the 
prefrontal cortex. !Adapted with permission from Barbas (1995).] 
The following properties of Figure II arc consistent with this anatomical interpretation: 
The amygdala, and related structures, has been identified in both animals and humans to 
be a brain region that is involved in learning and eliciting memories of experiences with 
strong emotional significance (Aggleton, 1993; Davis, 1994; Gloor eta/., 1982; Halgren et 
a/., 1978; LeDoux, 1993). The orbitofrontal cortex is known to be a major projection area 
of the ventral, or object-processing, cortical visual stream (Barbas, 1995; Fulton, 1950; 
Fustcr, 1989; Rolls, 1998; Wilson el a/., 1993), and cells in the orbitofrontal cortex are 
sensitive to the reward associations of sensory cues, as well as to how satiated the 
corresponding drive is at any time (e.g., Mishkin and Aggleton, 1981; Rolls, 1998). The 
feedback between the second and first sensory stages may be interpreted as an example of 
the ubiquitous positive feedback that occurs between cortical regions (Fcllcman and Van 
Essen, 1991; Macchi and Rinvik, 1976; Sillito eta/., 1994; Tsumoto, Creutzfcldt, and 
Leg ndy, 1978), including prefrontal and sensory cortices. Finally, the model is also 
consistent with data suggesting that the ventral prefrontal cortex and the amygdala arc 
involved in the process by which responses are selected on the basis of their emotional 
valence and success in achieving rewards (Damasio et a/., 1991; Passingham, 1997). In 
particular, Fustcr ( 1989) has concluded from studies of monkeys that the orbital 
prefrontal cortex helps to suppress inappropriate responses. These monkey data are 
consistent with clinical evidence that patients with injury to orbital prefrontal cortex tend 
to behave in an inappropriate manner (Blumer and Benson, 1975; Liddle, 1994). Other 
research has suggested that schizophrenia may involve a chronic deficiency in striatal 
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glutamate transmission due to decreased activity in those regions of the prefrontal cortex 
that project to the striatum (Andreasen, I 990; Carlsson, 1988; Grace, I 991; Lynch, 
1992). The CogEM model suggests that one possible cause of decreased prefrontal 
activity may be a reduction in incentive motivational signals from depressed amygdala 
circuits that project to the prefrontal cortex. 
SENSORY PREFRONTAL 
CORTEX CORTEX 
Ll AMYGDALA 
• 
DRIVE 
-
Figure 11. Oue anatom-
ical interpretation of the 
CogEM model in Figure 9 
in terms of the anatomical 
connections in Figure 10. 
Multiple copies of 
CogEM-style connections 
may occur in other 
thalamo-cortical and 
corticocortical circuits. 
Interestingly, Damasio (I999, p. I78, Figure 6.1) has proposed a circuit that is very 
similar to the Co gEm circuits in Figures 9-ll to explain how core consciousness arises. 
In his proposal, the first sensory stage is called the map of object x and the second 
sensory stage is called the second-order map . The drive representation is called the 
proto-self. As in the Co gEM model, conjoint inputs from the map of object and 
proto-self activate the second-order map which, in turn, attentionally enhances the 
map of object via top-down feedback. Damasio also notes that these structures bring 
together the very processes of homeostasis, emotion, attention, and learning (see pp. 272-
273) that the CogEM model has been predicting for almost thirty years. The subsequent 
discussions of schizophrenia can thus be viewed as predictions about how prescribed 
brain mechanisms may influence core consciousness in schizophrenic patients. 
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Figure 12. When a drive 
rep1·esentation like the amygdala 
gets depressed, its diminished 
activation hy sensory events 
prevents normal interpretation of 
emotionally important events, and 
also attenuates motivationally-
appropl'iatc signals to and from 
the prefrontal cm-tex. 
8. Depression of the Amygdala and Negative Schizophrenic Symptoms 
Suppose that a drive representation, such as the amygdala, generates depressed responses 
to its inputs, for any of several possible reasons. Such a local imbalance in the model 
circuit of Figure II can generate many negative symptoms that are characteristic of 
schizophrenia, including the loss of a Theory of Mind (Frith, 1992, 1994), and the 
impoverishment of will that a Theory of Mind does not explain. 
1. PRIMARY EXCITATORY ASSOCIATIONS 
cs 
us 
Fear 
2. PRIMARY INHIBITORY ASSOCIATIONS 
cs L 
us 
Fear 
Relief ----~' 
cs 
ON OFF 
Figure 13. Opponent proces-
sing: A given CS can become 
conditioned both to the onset of 
a reinforcing event, as well as to 
its offset. The offset response 
may be due to an antagonistic 
rebound of activation within a 
drive representation that codes 
an opponent emotional response 
to the one caused by onset of the 
reinforcing event. 
The most immediate effect of such 
a depressed response in emotion-
representing areas is flat affect. 
This defect, in turn, causes an 
inability to represent others 
belief.~ and intentions, in the sense 
that all mental states that depend 
upon interpreting one s own 
emotional state, or the emotional 
states of others, will be 
diminished. This happens in the 
model, as indicated in Figure 12, 
because emotionally charged 
sensory inputs, such as the 
emotional expressions on other 
peoples faces, will activate the 
appropriate part of inferotemporal 
cortex but will not elicit an 
appropriate emotional response in 
the amygdala and related emotion-
Relief representing circuits. As a result, 
photos of people would 
necessarily be described physically, rather than in terms of emotionally relevant mental 
states (Pilowsky and Bassett, 1980). 
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A problem with impoverishment of will, as well as with the setting of goals and 
intentions, will then indirectly arise. This happens in the model circuit of Figure 12 
because the depressed response of the drive representation also depresses the incentive 
motivational signals that would normally activate the prefrontal cortex in response to 
motivationally salient events. As a result, the prefrontal cortex will not be adequately 
activated, and a hypofrontal condition will emerge (Weinberger, 1988). Due to this 
hypofrontality, the working memory representations and plans that are ordinarily formed 
within the prefrontal cortex will be degraded, so goals will not form in a normal fashion. 
Given a hypofrontal response, top-down signals from the prefrontal cortex to the sensory 
cortices will also be reduced or eliminated (see Figure 12). As a result, the sensory 
representations will not be able to use these top-down signals to organize information-
processing according to its emotional meaning or motivational goals. Said in another way, 
motivationally irrelevant information will not be blocked from attention, so it will be able 
to continually intrude, leading to distractability. Or, in Kraepelin s words, schizophrenics 
lose both inclination and ability on their own initiative to keep their attention fixed for 
any length of time. 
9. How Drive Representations Get Depressed: Opponent Processing, Antagonistic 
Rebound, and Arousal 
The above theoretical considerations suggest that a depressed drive representation, as in 
the amygdala, may be one cause of hypoti·ontality in schizophrenia. This conclusion is 
complicated by the fact that there are reciprocal connections between the amygdala and 
the prefi·ontal cortex (Amaral and Price, 1984; Turner eta/., 1980), so questions of cause 
and effect arc hard to disentangle. Let us take the hypothesis at face value in order to 
explore its implications. In particular, such a hypothesis raises the question of how can a 
drive representation become depressed? In order to answer this question, we need to ask 
how drive representations arc designed. Such an analysis has undergone several stages of 
theoretical development. Here only concepts that arc crucial for our purposes will be 
described. 
This refinement can be motivated as follows. Up to the present, we have discussed how 
the onset of a rewarding event like a shock acts like a negative reward. It is, however, also 
well known that the r!ff\·et of a shock can be positively rewarding, and may be used for 
escape and avoidance learning. For example, as noted in Figure 13, a CS that occurs before 
a shock US begins can be conditioned to a negatively reinforcing fear response (Estes and 
Skinner, 1941 ), but a CS that occurs after a shock US terminates can be conditioned to a 
positively reinforcing relief response (Denny, 1971 ). The model proposes that offset of a 
shock input to cells whose activation subserves fear causes an antagonistic rebound of 
activation at cells that subserve relief. Similar rebound properties occur during 
instrumental, or operant, conditioning (Reynolds, 1968). The cells at which fear and relief 
are represented form an opponent processing circuit. Each CS can potentially get 
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conditioned either to the fear channel or to the relief channel of such an opponent 
processing circuit. 
Opponent processing circuits are ubiquitous in the brain. In addition to their role in 
controlling emotional conditioning, they also influence perceptual processing, where they 
are used to represent opponent colors such as red and green, or perpendicular orientations 
such as vertical and horizontal, or opposite directions such as up or down (Brown, 1965; 
Helmholtz, 1866, 1962; Sekuler, 1975). In all of these situations, offset of the ON channel 
in an opponent process can lead to an antagonistic rebound in the OFF channel. For 
example, after sustained viewing of a red image, its offset can lead to a negative aftereffect 
of green. After sustained viewing of water flowing downwards, its offset can lead to a 
negative aftereffect of upward motion. Motor behaviors may also have an opponent 
organization, as illustrated by the existence of GO and STOP signals for gating the onset 
or offset of motor actions in the basal ganglia (Horak and Anderson, 1984a, 1984b ), and 
the opponent organization and control of flexor and extensor muscle groups. 
Why is opponent processing so ubiquitous in the nervous system? I have proposed that 
opponent processing helps the brain to self-organize its neural circuits in a self-stabilizing 
way, both during childhood development and adult learning; that is, it helps to 
dynamically buffer brain development and learning against catastrophic reorganization by 
irrelevant environmental fluctuations (e.g., Grossberg, 1980). Antagonistic rebounds 
within these opponent processes help to reset cell activations in response to rapidly 
changing events, and thereby to help drive a search process for better representations of 
the world. 
Antagonistic rebonnds can be triggered within an opponent process in at least two ways: 
a sudden decrease of a phasic input to one channel of the opponent circuit, and an 
unexpected event. A sudden decrease of input to one channel (say, the fear channel, or 
the red channel) can lead to a transient activation, or antagonistic rebound of activity, in 
the opponent channel (say, the relief channel, or the green channel). For example, 
when there is a sudden decrease of fearful cues in a given situation, then the relief rebound 
can supply positive motivation with which to learn the sensory-motor contingencies that 
led to the reduction of fear, or to extinguish a previously fearful memory of a situation 
that is no longer fearful ( cf., Denny, 1971; Grossberg, 1982b, 1984b, 1987b; Masterson, 
1970; McAllister and McAllister, 197la, 1971 b; Reynierse and Rizley, 1970). A neural 
analog is found after electrical stimulation of the hypothalamus: If hypothalamic 
stimulation elicits a given behavior, then its offset can transiently elicit an opposite 
behavior (Cox, Kakolewski, and Valenstein, 1969; Valenstein, Cox, and Kakolewski, 
1969). 
How does offset of an input to the ON channel of an opponent process cause an 
antagonistic rebound of activation in the OFF channel? In order for this to happen, at 
least two properties are needed: First, prior activity in the ON channel biases a process in 
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that channel which changes on a slower time scale than the rate with which the input to 
the ON channel can change. The slower time scale of this process determines how long 
the ON input needs to be kept on before a strong antagonistic rebound can be elicited. 
When the ON input shuts off, this slowly varying process biases the response of the 
opponent circuit to favor activation in the OFF channel. Second, there must be some type 
of internal input source, or tonically active arousal, that can energize the antagonistic 
rebound when the phasic ON input shuts off. When these concepts are rigorously 
implemented in an opponent processing circuit, it follows as a mathematical consequence 
that the circuit gets depressed in the manner summarized in Figure 1 when its arousal level 
becomes too small or too large. 
I 0. Habituative Transmitter Gates as Unbiased Transducers 
What is the slowly varying process that calibrates an antagonistic rebound? I suggest that 
it is a habituative chemical transmitter that multiplicatively gates, or multiplies, signals 
within the opponent processing channels. A simple derivation of such a transmitter law 
clarifies how it operates as an unbiased transducer of neural signals. Suppose that the 
input signal is S and the output signal is T. Then the simplest unbiased law is a linear law: 
T = SB, where B is a constant that determines the gain of the response by T to the input 
S. Suppose that T is due to release of a chemical transmitter y at a synapse. In this 
situation, the unbiased law can be rewritten as T = Sy, where y approximately equals B in 
order to preserve the gain, or sensitivity, of the transduction process. The law T = Sy can 
be interpreted as a mass action law for the rate which transmitter is released in response 
to input S and available transmitter y. This law says that y multiplicatively gates the 
input S to produce the output T. The constraint that y approximates B means that y 
accumulates until it reaches the target level 13. 
Transmitter y cannot maintain the target level B at all times if it is being released, or 
inactivated, at rate T, unless the accumulation rate is infinite. No biological process occurs 
at an infinite rate. The simplest differential equation whereby y can attempt to satisfy 
both constraints at a finite rate is given in Figure 14. This is the simplest law for a 
habituative transmitter gate (Grossberg, 1968, 1969, 1980, 1984a, 1984b). lt is also called 
a law for synaptic depression, and has recently attracted a great deal of renewed interest 
through the experimental and modeling work of Larry Abbott, Henry Markram, and their 
colleagues (Abbott et a/., 1997; Markram et a/., 1997; Markram and Tsodkyks, 1996; 
Tsodyks et a/., 1998), which has provided neurophysiological evidence for properties of 
depressing synapses that had previously been used to model many types of 
psychophysical data, notably data about visual perception (e.g., Carpenter and 
Grossberg, 1981; Francis and Grossberg, 1996a, 1996b; Francis, Grossberg, and Mingolla, 
1994; Grossberg, 1980, 1987a; gmen, 1993; gmen and Gagn, 1990). 
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Figure 14. How the 
output T(t), which is 
a product of the 
rapidly varying input 
S(t) and the more 
slowing habituating, 
ot· depressing, trans-
mitter y(t), generates 
overshoots and 
dy dt = A(B - y) - Sy 
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Figure 14 illustrates 
how, in response to a 
rapidly changing input 
signal S(t), a 
habilualive transmiller 
z(t) can more slowly 
equilibrate to the 
t input s changing 
amplitudes. Higher 
input amplitudes inactivate more transmitter and lead to lower levels of available 
transmitter; note that transmitter has the input intensity S(l) in its denominator. The 
transmitter z(t) multiplies, or gates, the input S(t) to generate the output signal 'T'(t) = 
S(t)z(t). Due to this gating process, monotonic changes in input amplitude S(t) cause 
overshoots and undershoots in the gated output T(t), before the transmitter gradually 
equilibrates, or habituates, to the new input level. Right after the input S(t) changes to a 
new level, during the overshoot or undershoot phase, the output T(t) has the new input 
level S(t) in its numerator, but the old level of S(t) in its denominator due to the slow rate 
with which the transmitter changes. The new input level is hereby weighted, or 
normalized, by the old input level. This is called the Weber Law property. It occurs 
during many types of brain processing, for example during adaptation by the retina to 
varying levels of light (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1981 ). This Weber Law properly plays 
a key role in determining the Inverted-U with respect to arousal level in an opponent 
process, as summarized by Figure I. In other words, this sort of depression can be traced 
lo how general properties of unbiased chemical transmiller gates interact with 
mechanisms of opponent processing. 
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11. Gated Dipole Opponent Processes: Arousal, Transmitters, Signals, 
Competition, and Thresholds 
The opponent processes that are modeled here are called gated dipoles because they use 
transmitter gates to regulate the output from the two poles, or channels, of the opponent 
process. The paradoxical emergent properties of a gated dipole are due to five basic 
mechanisms acting together (Grossberg, 1972b, 1980, 1984a, 1984b). Figure 15 depicts 
the simplest example of a circuit that realizes these mechanisms. The ON channel is 
turned on by a phasic input, denoted by .J in Figure 15; the OFF channel registers the 
antagonistic rebound that occurs when the phasic input to the ON channel shuts off. The 
five mechanisms are: (!) a source of nonspecific arousal, denoted by I in Figure 15, 
energizes both channels of the dipole; (2) a nonlinear signal function, denoted by f, 
transduecs the sum of phasic and arousal inputs to each channel; (3) a habituative 
transmitter substance multiplies, or gates, the nonlinear signals in both channels; ( 4) the 
gated signals compete via an on-center off-surround network; and (5) the net signal after 
competition is half-wave rectified, or thrcsholded, before generating an output fi·om the 
network. 
How an antagonistic rebound is generated by the gated dipole in Figure 15 can now be 
described. First, the phasic input .J is added to the tonic input 1 within the ON channel 
before being transduced by the signal function f. The result is a step input on a positive 
tonic baseline, denoted by x1 in Figure 16. This generates a signal that is gated by the 
habituative transmitter in the ON channel, which is located in the square synaptic knob. 
Just as in Figure 14, the step input is transformed by the habituative transmitter into 
overshoots and undershoots of the gated ON channel activity, denoted by x1. The OFF 
channel just processes a tonic baseline of activity, denoted by x4. When x4 is subtracted 
from x1 in the ON channel, the tonic baseline is shifted downwards, as in x5, to the value 
zero (at least in this simplified example). The OFF channel generates the same activity 
pattern as the ON channel, but with opposite sign, as in x6. Next, these activities are half· 
wave rectified, or thresholdcd, in order to generate output signals. The result is a 
sustained, but habituativc, response in the ON channel, and a transient antagonistic 
rebound in the OFF channel. The antagonistic rebound is energized by the arousal input I, 
which can activate the OFF channel even after the phasic input J to the ON channel shuts 
off, due to the slow rate with which the transmitter in the ON channel recovers from the 
previous phasic input J. 
Many variations on this circuit exist, including variations in which the ON response is 
transient (Baloch eta/., 1999; gmen and Gagn, 1990), or the dipole includes feedback 
pathways that can store activities in short-term memory (Grossberg and Schmajuk, 1987) 
and even generate periodic clock-wise oscillations during circadian rhythms (Carpenter 
and Grossberg, 1983, 1984, 1985). Other work (e.g., Grossberg, 1972a, 1972b, 1980, 
1982b, 1984a, 1984b; Grossberg and Gutowski, 1987) used gated dipoles to explain data 
about cognitive-emotional learning and decision making. It is because so many data about 
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normal cognitive-emotional behaviors have been clarified by these circuits that their 
ability to naturally map onto clinical properties takes on such potential significance. 
12. The Golden Mean: Inverted-U Opponent Processing as a Function of Arousal 
The main point for present purposes is that such an opponent process gets depressed if 
it receives an arousal level that is either too small or too large (Figure 1). Such Inverted-U 
properties are well-known to occur in behavior. For example, D-amphetamine sulfate 
activates feeding in an anorectic cat at the same dose that totally inhibits feeding in a 
normal cat (Wolgin eta/., 1976). In normal cats, smaller amounts of norepinephrine can 
have effects opposite to those of larger amounts (Leibowitz, 1974). In like manner, 
amphetamine augments slow behavior and depresses fast behavior (Dews, 1958). In 
humans, dopamine pharmacological manipulations have shown that the relation of 
dopamine activity to reaction-time performance is an Inverted-U function (Netter and 
Rammsayer, 1991; Rammsayer, Netter, and Vogel, 1993; Zuckerman, 1984). Subjects 
high on extraversion and sensation seeking scales show impaired task performance if a 
dopamine agonist is applied, and improved performance if an antagonist is applied. The 
opposite pattern was found in subjects low in these traits. lnverted-U s have also been 
reported in event-related potentials, such as the Contingent Negative Variation, or CNV 
(Tecce and Cole, 1974), which is interpreted in terms of the model s incentive 
motivational pathway fi·om the drive representations (Figure ll ). 
13. Undcraroused and Ovcrarouscd Depressive Syndromes 
As noted in Figure l, an underaroused gated dipole generates a syndrome of Underaroused 
Depression. Here, due lo how the small arousal level interacts with the nonlinear signal f 
and the opponent competition, inputs must be larger than normal in order to generate 
suprathreshold outputs. Paradoxically, once inputs arc chosen large enough to overcome 
this threshold, then the circuit is h)perexcitable above threshold, meaning that the dipole 
generales abnormally large outputs in response to additional input increments. This is 
paradoxical because a naive view might conclude that an elevated threshold would make 
the circuit less, rather than more, excitable. This hyperexcitability is due to the Weber 
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Figure 15. A gated dipole 
opponent process can generate 
habituative ON 1·esponses and 
transient OFF responses to the 
phasic onset and offset, 
respectively, of an input to its 
ON channel. See text for details. 
Law property; namely, the 
abnormally small arousal level 
creates an abnormally small 
denominator in the transmitter 
terms that define dipole outputs. 
Because such a circuit IS 
hyperexcitable at low arousal 
levels, its excitability can be 
brought into the normal range by 
increasing its arousal level until it 
reaches the peak of the lnvcrtcd-
U. Here, the threshold is lower, 
but the networks excitability is 
also lower. These properties clarify the paradoxical fact that an arousing drug can make a 
gated dipole less excitable. This fact suggests how amphetamines may help attention 
deficit disorder patients (Swanson and Kinsbournc, 1976; Weiss and Hcchtmann, 1979) 
and L-dopa may help Parkinson s patients (Riklan, 1973). 
Unlimited increases in arousal do not make a dipole behave more normally. Too much 
arousal generates a syndrome of Overarouscd Depression. Here the extra arousal causes 
the response threshold to be very low. Paradoxically, however, the circuit is h)'lJOexcitable 
above this low threshold, so that it generates small responses, if any, to inputs of 
arbitrary size. This is also due to the Weber Law property. Thus too much of a good 
thing , such as amphetamine or L-dopa for the patients mentioned above, can create a 
new, and complementary, problem to the one for which they arc being treated. 
14. Schizophrenia as an Overaroused Depressive Syndrome 
The formal symptoms of the model when its drive representations are ovcraroused arc 
strikingly reminiscent of negative schizophrenic symptoms. Data consistent with this 
proposal include the following: Some types of schizophrenia have been ascribed to 
dopamine hyperactivity of various parts of the limbic system, including increased 
dopaminergic input to the amygdala (Lloyd, 1978; Reynolds, 1983, 1987). This type of 
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effect may be interpreted as an overaroused condition. This hypothesis is consistent with 
data showing that dopaminergic agonists, such as L-dopa and amphetamine, can produce a 
behavioral syndrome that has been compared to schizophrenia (Riklan, I 973; Stevens, 
1993; Torrey and Peterson, I 974; Wallach, I 974). In the opposite direction, various 
antipsychotic drugs block dopamine receptors (Kuhar et a!., I 978) and in sufficient 
quantities can produce a catalepsy that resembles Parkinson s disease (Hornykiewicz, 
1975). This latter result, which suggests that schizophrenia and Parkinson s disease are at 
opposite ends of a dopamine continuum, is consistent with model properties in the 
underaroused state that resemble Parkinson s disease (Grossberg, I 984a). More generally, 
the facts that an underaroused syndrome can be transmuted into an overaroused 
syndrome using a given drug, and that the reverse transformation can be caused by an 
oppositely acting drug, suggest that the two syndromes may be extremal points on an 
lnverted-U of a common mechanistic substrate, albeit one that may exist in multiple brain 
regions for different behavioral purposes. 
Because opponent processes like gated dipoles are assumed to exist in many brain 
regions, too much of a drug that is aimed at correcting a dopaminergic imbalance in one 
brain region may create an opposite dopaminergic imbalance in other brain regions. In this 
way, a drug aimed at correcting an emotional imbalance may create a new imbalance in a 
different system, such as a motor system. Multiple secondary effects, including 
lateralized effects that are different in different brain hemispheres, may also occur due to 
these dopaminergic abnormalities (Early eta!., I 994), but these are beyond the scope of 
the present article. 
Because schizophrenia is a heterogeneous disease (Heinrichs, I 993), one issue that needs 
to be further studied experimentally is whether some schizophrenics who exhibit negative 
symptoms arc overaroused, while other may be underaroused. In either case, flat affect 
can ensue, but the two types of populations should exhibit different types of sensitivity 
(hypo versus hyper) to suitably chosen suprathrcshold inputs (Figure I). 
15. Weber-Law Models of Mental Disorders 
When a drive representation in the brain gets depressed due to underarousal or 
overarousal of a gated dipole circuit, this may be viewed as a Weber-Law mental disorder. 
By this is meant that tonic baseline signals determine brain sensitivity to phasic inputs in 
such a way that low arousal can cause hyperreactive responses to phasic inputs, whereas 
high arousal can cause hyporeactive responses to phasic inputs. Grace (1991) has 
suggested a Weber Law model in which low arousal is due to abnormally low prefrontal 
activity. The discussion above raises the question of whether this is a cause or an effect, 
or even whether the answer is the same in all patients. The problem is compounded by 
the fact that there exist multiple feedback loops in the brain regions that arc implicated in 
schizophrenia, including feedback between regions like amygdala and prefrontal cortex. 
The discussion above suggests how a primary lesion in emotional affect and conditioning 
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centers of the brain can have widespread cogmttve and affective indirect effects 
throughout the brain, including prefrontal cortex. 
DISCUSSION 
16. Concluding Remarks and Predictions 
The above discussion raises a number of issues that may be clarified by further research. 
One issue concerns the fact that either an underaroused or an overaroused drive 
representation may become depressed. It is not clear whether just one of these types of 
depression occurs in all schizophrenics. There are a number of criteria that the CogEM 
model predicts, however, which may in principle be used to distinguish between patients 
who differ on this dimension (Grossberg, 1984a). One of these is that underaroused 
syndromes tend to have elevated behavioral thresholds, but are h}JJersensitive to 
increments in phasic inputs after they exceed this threshold. In contrast, overaroused 
syndromes tend to have low thresholds, but are hyposensitive to suprathreshold phasic 
inputs. This is a manifestation of the Weber-law properties of such opponent processes. 
Another issue is whether depression of a drive representation like the amygdala causes 
hypofrontal reactions, or whether hypofrontality is a cause of depression in the drive 
representation. Because the amygdala and preihmtal cortex are reciprocally connected, 
this may be difficult to determine. This is particularly true because, as noted in Section 
I I, opponent processes can exist in sensory and cognitive representations, as well as in 
drive representations. One role for these opponent processes is to control discriminative 
behaviors that arc contingent upon the offset of events, or to reorganize information 
processing after unexpected events. For example, if your task is to push a lever when a 
light shuts off~ you need an internal representation to be activated transiently and 
selectively after the light shuts off with which to activate the level press. Likewise, 
unexpected events can disconfirm ongoing processing and amplify previously attenuated 
representations which may be likely to lead to more successful behavior. Thus, the very 
same arousal source that is depressing a drive representation like the amygdala may also 
be overarousing or underarousing prefrontal circuits. 
This raises the question of what the sources of arousal are that are hypothesized in the 
model. It is now well recognized that there arc several distinct arousal systems in the 
brain, and that they interact with one another in complicated ways (Marrocco, Witte, and 
Davidson, 1994; Robbins and Everitt, 1995). These include the locus coeruleous 
noradrenergic, magnocellular basal forebrain/pedunculopontine cholinergic, substantia 
nigra/ventral tegmental area dopaminergic, dorsal raphe serotoncrgic, and tuberomamillary 
hypothalamic histaminergic sources. 
This article discusses one type of arousal: conditioned reinforcer/incentive motivational 
arousal, and how its depression can lead to negative schizophrenic symptoms. Within the 
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larger Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) of which the CogEM model forms a part 
(Grossberg, 1999b), there are also several other types of arousal. These include the type 
of volitional arousal whereby a learned top-down expectation is converted from a 
modulator, or prime, of bottom-up information, into a suprathreshold activation that can 
be used to control internal fantasy, rehearsal, and planning (Grossberg, 1999a). When this 
type of arousal becomes imbalanced, the model undergoes a type of hallucination with 
many properties similar to those observed during schizophrenia. 
Another type of arousal is activated when bottom-up information mismatches top-down 
expectations, thereby leading to reset of short-term memory and other reactions that are 
mediated by a type of orienting arousal. Yet other types of arousal are used to control 
various action systems. The ART brain models thus predict the need for functionally 
different types of arousal. It remains to test how well the predicted arousal mechanisms 
match known brain arousal systems. 
One tentative possibility is that the locus coeruleous noradrenergic arousal system is 
involved in conditioned reinforcer/incentive motivational arousal because of its role in 
mediating responses to stimuli that are salient to the animal by virtue of conditioning 
(Aston-Jones, 1994). When this source of arousal is finally confirmed, it will have 
predictable effects on the type of core consciousness that Damasio (1999) has discussed. 
Within ART, this arousal system is part of an attcntional learning system that is 
complementary to an orienting system for dealing with unexpected events (Grossberg, 
1999b). It remains to be determined whether and how this predicted complementarity is 
realized within the known arousal systems of the brain, and whether, in fact, it is related 
to the complementary roles of the NA and 5-1-lT systems that is well-known to exist 
(Robbins and Everitt, 1995, p. 708). 
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